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Abstract. This paper develops a theory of informal insurance in the presence of an
intertemporal technology. It is shown that when an insurance agreement suﬀers from
enforcement problems, constraints on individual savings behaviour can enable the group
to sustain greater cooperation. This result provides a motivation for a variety of so-
cial norms observed in traditional societies which discourage ‘excessive’ accumulation of
wealth by individuals. The paper also shows that social norms that discourage savings
are more likely to beneﬁt poorer communities and thus, paradoxically, cause them to fall
further behind even as it serves a useful purpose.
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The role of culture in the process of economic development has long been a subject of
interest to social scientists. In recent years, in parallel to new developments in research
on formal institutions, there has also been renewed interest in the question whether the
varied economic paths of diﬀerent societies through history can be traced to fundamental
diﬀerences in their respective cultures, and the customs and social norms to which they
give rise (see Platteau 2001 and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006 for surveys of this
literature).
The discussion around social norms and economic development tends to distinguish be-
tween and concentrate on good and bad practices: on those that appear to encourage
economic activity or provide an eﬀective solution to a problem of social organisation and
others that are unambiguously harmful for economic development. For example, Landes
(1998) distinguish between cultural factors such as thrift, hard work, tenacity, honesty
and tolerance that promote economic development, in contrast to xenophobia and reli-
gious intolerance that stiﬂe enterprise. Greif (1994) highlights the merits of individualist
cultural beliefs as opposed to collectivist cultural beliefs for the formation of eﬃcient
agency relations, in the context of medieval merchants; while Putnam (1993) attribute
the greater success of modern political institutions in northern Italy to the pre-existence
of a stronger civic culture.
This paper argues that a wide range of social norms may not easily ﬁt into one or the
other of these categories for a natural reason: where a cooperative agreement has to
be self-enforcing, eﬃcient norms take the form that ensures continued dependence of
the individual on the service provided by the group; for it is precisely the need for this
service which would induce the individual to keep his end of the bargain. In this manner,
social norms appear both as constraining economic behaviour of agents at the individual
level and as promoting cooperation at the level of the group. A practice that appears
wasteful for an individual may be welfare-improving when the group and the surplus that
it generates is taken into account.
The paper makes this argument formally in the context of self-enforcing mutual insurance
agreements in an environment where agents have access to an intertemporal technology.
In a self-enforcing contract, an agent is willing assist another member of the insurance
network today only to the extent he values the promise of insurance from the networkSOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 3
in the future. In the absence of an insurance network, own savings provide the agent
an alternative means to smooth consumption in the face of adverse shocks. Therefore,
increased saving on his part improves his ability to smooth consumption on his own,
and thus lowers his need for the network. This means that if agents participating in an
informal insurance network are discouraged from saving, greater demands can be made of
them, to assist a fellow member in need, when such a situation arises. Consequently, in
the constrained eﬃcient agreement, individuals save below the level that is individually
optimal, and the group achieves a higher level of insurance than would otherwise be
possible. This is the main insight of the paper.
Thus, we obtain a theoretical result which shows how social norms that constrain the
accumulation of wealth within a society can be welfare improving. Interestingly, the
anthropological literature provides a variety of examples of precisely such social norms.
Platteau (2000: Chapter 5) provides a survey of studies on tribal societies where social
beliefs that associate the accumulation of excessive wealth to manifestations of witchcraft
serve as severe deterrents to wealth accumulation by individuals. In addition, the obli-
gation of marking important events in a household — birth, marriage or death — through
extravagant feasts is common to many traditional societies
2. The prevalence of such norms
in traditional societies shows that it is often within the means of a social group to in-
duce its members to engage in excessive consumption, as stipulated by the constrained
eﬃcient insurance agreement. This is not to argue that such social behaviour may have
evolved speciﬁcally to ensure that households continue to depend on their social networks
for insurance purposes. But more importantly, the paper provides a theoretical frame-
work where it becomes apparent that such practices may have a positive eﬀect on welfare,
through their impact on group cooperation.
Interestingly, the type of social norms discussed here would tend to accentuate the diﬀer-
ences between social groups that initially ﬁnd it worthwhile to adopt them and those that
do not. In the context of mutual insurance, we show that if there is some cost involved in
forming an insurance network, they are more likely to arise in poorer communities, where
individuals cannot eﬀectively smooth consumption using own assets. Richer communities
fail to form insurance networks and therefore also have no reason to adopt the social
constraints which facilitate informal insurance in the presence of enforcement problems.
In the absence of such constraints, they can opt for a higher growth path of consumption
2See, for example, Bloch, Rao and Desai (2004) for a discussion on excessive wedding expenditures in
India; and Manuh (1995) for a discussion on exorbitant funerals in West Africa.4 ZAKI WAHHAJ
and wealth accumulation, compared to their counterparts who start oﬀ poor and do ﬁnd
it worthwhile to adopt the norms that constrain savings. Thus, the initial diﬀerences in
wealth which makes the relevant social norms useful among some social groups and not
in others would widen over time.
Thanks to a number of signiﬁcant contributions in this area in recent years, the theoret-
ical characteristics of self-enforcing mutual insurance agreements and their implications
for empirical work are well-understood today. However, for the sake of analytical sim-
plicity, the literature has concentrated, for the most part, on an environment where no
intertemporal technology is available to the agents. An important exception in this re-
gard is Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000), who also consider mutual insurance in an
environment where a savings technology is available. In particular, they show that in the
constrained eﬃcient agreement, the consumption stream satisﬁes a modiﬁed Euler equa-
tion involving an additional term that depends on how saving aﬀects the participation
constraints. The key theoretical insight of this paper is to relate this term to the premium
that agents are willing to pay to participate in the insurance agreement.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed
survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on informal insurance. The model is
presented in section 3, while sections 3.1 and 3.2 investigate self-enforcing insurance agree-
ments and constrained eﬃcient agreements respectively. Section 4 considers implications
of the main results for communities that initially vary in the level of wealth, and section
5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
The idea of limited commitment as a basis of mutual insurance has been explored and
developed extensively in the literature; it was ﬁrst formalised in Kimball (1988) in the con-
text of farm households in a rural community. Coate and Ravallion (1993) characterised
the conditions under which the ﬁrst-best insurance can be implemented under limited
commitment. Kocherlakota (1996) provided a characterisation of constrained eﬃcient
agreements, and examined their long-run dynamics. Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002)
showed that the constrained eﬃcient agreements are characterised by a simple updating
rule; speciﬁcally, that for each state of nature, there is a time-invariant interval for the
ratio of marginal utilities; and in each period, the ratio of marginal utilities adjusts by
the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval.SOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 5
Fafchamps (1999) argued that the theoretical characteristics of informal insurance un-
der limited commitment correspond closely to the empirical evidence on gift-giving and
informal credit in rural societies. For example, Udry (1994) ﬁnds that the terms of re-
payment of informal credit in rural Nigeria is aﬀected by both shocks to the creditor and
the debtor; which corresponds to the characteristics of informal insurance under limited
commitment. Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) test the limited commitment model
using Indian village data and ﬁnd that it can explain the consumption path of households
more eﬀectively than either the full insurance or the autarkic model.
The theoretical literature discussed thus far have generally assumed, for simplicity, that
no intertemporal technology is available in the economy. An important exception to this
literature is Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000), which investigates the properties of risk-
sharing agreements in an environment where this assumption is relaxed. They show that
in the constrained eﬃcient agreement the consumption stream satisﬁes a modiﬁed Euler
equation involving an additional term that depends on how saving aﬀects the participation
constraints. The key theoretical insight in the current paper is to relate this term to the
premium that agents are willing to pay to participate in the insurance agreement. Ligon,
Thomas and Worrall (2000) also provide an example where introduction of a savings
technology diminishes welfare within a risk-sharing agreement.
Gobert and Poitevin (2006) study a related model where an agent who breaches a risk-
sharing agreement also forfeits his savings. In this setting, saving functions like a collateral
and always tends to slacken an agent’s participation constraint. Therefore, in contrast to
main result in this paper, the prescribed level of saving in a constrained eﬃcient agreement
is generally higher than that an individual would choose on his own.
The main result in this paper also has an interesting parallel in the literature on risk-
sharing under private information. However, the mechanism at work in each case is quite
diﬀerent. Atkeson and Lucas (1992) study an environment where agents are subject
to private idiosyncratic shocks and there is no scope for saving. They show that it is
possible to induce agents to report their shocks truthfully by providing a ’front-loaded’
consumption stream to those who report a bad shock in the current period, and a ’back-
loaded’ consumption stream to those who do not. Thus, some degree of risk-sharing
is possible although shocks are unobserved. However, if agents have access to hidden
storage, they would care only about the net present value of future transfers, not its
timing. Then risk-sharing will break down since, under any insurance scheme, truthful6 ZAKI WAHHAJ
reporting is no longer incentive-compatible (Cole and Kocherlakota 2001; see also Allen
1985). A social planner’s ability to observe and constrain saving in this environment
enables him to distinguish better between individuals with good and bad shocks for risk-
sharing purposes
3.
By contrast, we show in the present paper that, when no borrowing is possible, con-
straints on saving diminishes an agent’s ability to self-insure and therefore improves his
commitment to a risk-sharing agreement. In line with the recent literature, we believe
that the full information, limited commitment model may be more pertinent to the study
of risk-sharing in village economies where formal enforcement institutions are absent but
individuals generally have good information on the assets and incomes of their neighbours.
3. The Model
We consider an environment with n agents, represented by the set I = {1,..,n}. Each
agent faces a stochastic income stream, denoted {yi(t)}t=1,2...,∞. In each period, there are
S possible states of the world; and the probability of each state s ∈ S equals πs, with
￿
s∈S πs = 1; i.e. the distribution of states is independantly and identically distributed
over time. The income earned by person i when the realised state is s is denoted yi
s. Each
agent also has access to an intertemporal technology whereby 1 unit of the good stored
at the end of period t is transformed into σ units in period t + 1.
Individuals have the means to transfer some of their savings or income to each other in
each period. The exact sequence of events within each period is as follows:




(ii) each agent i publicly pledges amounts τ
ij
t ≥ 0 to transfer to each agent j  = i, and ki
t
to save at the end of the period;
3Yet another parallel exists for dynamic principle-agent models. Here again a distinct mechanism is
at work. An agent’s saving acts as a buﬀer against any future punishment the principle would inﬂict in
the event of poor performance. Therefore, constraints on saving induces the agent to put in more eﬀort
in the future to avoid punishment (Rogerson 1985; Kocherlakota 2004; see also Golosov, Kocherlakota,
Tsyvinski 2003 for a generalisation of the result in Rogerson 1985).SOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 7
(iii) agents choose whether to ‘approve’ or ‘reject’ all pledges made; if pledges are univer-
sally approved and are ‘feasible’ then the transfers and savings take place as pledged. If
not, no transfers take place and individuals have a second opportunity to allocate autarkic
resources between consumption and saving.


















Thus, transfers and savings decisions are, in eﬀect, collectively decided within the com-
munity. In particular, it is not possible for an agent to accept transfers from others in
the community during a certain period, and then to choose a level of consumption that
does not meet with their approval. This may be a reasonable approximation of reality
given that, in a village community, transfers and consumption would take place conti-
nously through time, and the deviation by a community member from any consumption
or saving rule, if publicly observed, can face immediate retaliation.4.












where ui() is increasing and strictly concave. To ensure interior solutions for consump-
tion, we also assume limc→0 ui′ (c) = ∞. Since ui() is concave, agents prefer to smooth
consumption across time and over diﬀerent states of the world. They have two means of
doing so; by engaging in precautionary saving using the intertemporal technology, and by
participating in a mutual insurance agreement.
Before considering mutual insurance agreements, we introduce some terms and notation
that will be used later in the analysis. Let ht = (s1,s2,...,st) denote a particular history of
realised states up to and including period t. Let Ht denote the set of all possible histories
of states in period t. We deﬁne an agreement A as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1. An agreement is a complete plan of all bilateral transfers made, as well
as the level of savings chosen, by each agent, in each period, contingent on the history of
states.
4This setup is equivalent to that adopted in Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000). An alternative pos-
sibility for modelling purposes would be for agents to make and accept transfers before savings decisions
are made. We do not explore this route in this paper for it adds considerably to the complexity of the
analytical problem.8 ZAKI WAHHAJ












i ∈ I,ht ∈ Ht,t = 1..∞5. Such an agreement would specify that if the history of realised
states in period t is ht, then an agent i should make transfers τ
ij
t (ht) to, and receive trans-
fers τ
ji
t (ht) from, each agent j during the period and have savings of ki
t (ht) at the end of














t (ht) ≥ 0 for each period t and possible history ht. An agreement implicitly deﬁnes
a consumption stream if we assume that whatever assets are not saved at the end of a
period will be consumed. Then the consumption stream {ci




t (ht) = σk
i















where s is the realised state in period t.
Note that two agreements that prescribe the same levels of savings and net transfers after
each history also imply the same consumption streams and are identical for analytical
purposes. Also note that an agreement is not equivalent to a complete strategy proﬁle
because the transfers and savings prescribed by the agreement are not contingent on the
history of past actions. However, the prescriptions of an agreement are suﬃciently detailed
to address the question what utility levels can be sustained through mutual insurance in a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Both these assertions will become apparent in the following
section when we provide a characterisation of subgame perfect equilibria.
We denote by A|ht the continuation agreement implied by A after history ht has been
realised. Also let A1|ht denote the same continuation agreement except that all transfers
in period t following history ht equal to zero.. Deﬁne V i (z,A) as the maximum utility
that person i can achieve in expectation with initial assets z when he participates in an
agreement A. Similarly, Ui
a (z) is the maximum expected utility that person i can achieve
in autarky using initial assets z. Let Ii (z,A1|ht) be the amount of money agent i would
be willing to forego in the current period, given assets z, to participate in the continuation
agreement A1|ht. Then, assuming z > Ii(z,A1|ht), we have that I = Ii(z,A1|ht) solves
the following equation:
(1) V
i (z − I,A1|ht) = U
i
a (z)
5For the sake of legibility, we suppress the notation for the range of values of i,ht,t whenever writing
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The condition z > Ii (z,A1|ht) is necessary to ensure that the expression V i (z − Ii (..),A1|ht)
is well-deﬁned. The equation in (1) will frequently appear in our analysis since it will hold
whenever the participation constraint is binding for person i for a particular allocation of
resources. We will, in particular, be interested in the eﬀect of additional saving by per-
son i on a binding participation constraint, which is the subject of the following lemma
(below, we denote by ˜ τi
t (A|ht), net transfers by agent i following history ht).
Lemma 3.1. Given a continuation agreement A|ht if agent i has asset level z > Ii (z,A1|ht),













Proof. We are given
˜ τ
i
t (A|ht) = I
i (z,A1|ht)
Deﬁne A′ (z) as an alternate agreement that corresponds to A for all t,ht except that trans-
fers following history ht are a function of the parameter z: τi
t (A′(z)|ht) = Ii (z,A1|ht),
τ
−i
t (A′ (z)|ht) = 0. Therefore, by deﬁnition of Ii (z,A1|ht), we must have
V
i (z,A
′ (z)|ht) ≡ U
i
a (z)


























Note that we can replace A′(z) by A since, as per the initial condition, the net transfers

















Lemma 3.1 says that if, for a particular level of assets, an agreement provides an indi-
vidual zero surplus over autarky, then the marginal eﬀect on the surplus, of an increase
in assets, equals the marginal change in the individual’s valuation of the continuation
agreement. This change corresponds to the eﬀect of increased saving on a binding par-
ticipation constraint in a constrained eﬃcient agreement. As will be seen, this technical
result provides the crucial step of reasoning for the propositions that follow.10 ZAKI WAHHAJ
3.1. Self-Enforcing Agreements. In this section, we characterise agreements that can
be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium. These characterisations will be used later
to analyse constrained eﬃcient agreements. The results in this section are based on the
techniques developed in Abreu (1988) and closely follows the reasoning behind a similar
proposition in Kocherlakota (1996).











and the associated con-
sumption streams {ci
t(ht)} can be obtained in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if























i ∈ I,∀ht ∈ Ht,t = 1..∞
where ci
t (ht) = σki













The conditions ensure that for each person i, after each possible history, the expected
utility obtained from the consumption path speciﬁed by the allocation is at least as large
as the maximum expected utility that can be obtained under autarky. The reasoning
behind the proposition is brieﬂy sketched here. The proof can be found in the appendix.
If a particular allocation is obtained in a subgame perfect equilibrium, then it must
satisfy the conditions above; if it does not hold for some individual after some history, she
could improve her expected utility by deviating to the autarkic strategy in that subgame.
Conversely, if an allocation satisﬁes the conditions speciﬁed above, then a strategy proﬁle
along the following lines would be subgame perfect: each individual, after each possible
history, chooses transfers and savings as speciﬁed by the allocation; if any individual
deviates at a point in time, then he receives no transfers thereafter. As the cost of
deviation is autarky, which cannot be utility-improving by construction, this strategy
proﬁle is subgame perfect.
Note that the conditions under which an agreement is subgame perfect, and the level
of welfare it provides to each agent, are fully determined by the consumption and sav-
ing levels implied by the agreement. The consumption levels, in turn, depends on the net
transfers and savings made by each agent under each contingency, but not on the bilateralSOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 11
transfers among agents. Thus, in terms of constrained eﬃciency, two agreements that pre-
scribe the same level of net transfers and savings, for each agent, under each contingency,
are identical. Therefore, to simplify the analysis of constrained eﬃcient agreements, we













Since all transfers are made to, or received from, members of the community, the total
sum of net transfers should equal zero:
￿
i∈I ˜ τi
t (ht) = 0.
3.2. Constrained Eﬃcient Agreements. Among the allocations that can be obtained
in a subgame perfect equilibrium, we concentrate, as in the related literature, on those
that are constrained eﬃcient; i.e. on allocations where agents exploit all the potential







be the maximum expected utility that agent n can obtain in
a subgame perfect equilibrium, when the level of utility to be received by the other n−1
agents are at least U
1,..,U
n−1, and the initial wealth levels of the n agents are given by







































































t (ht) = 0 for ∀ht ∈ Ht,t = 1..∞ (7)
where ci




t (ht). The expression in (3) is optimised over
the saving levels and net transfers only since, as mentioned in the previous section, these
terms fully describe the consumption levels and outside options implied by an agreement
following each history. The conditions in (4) ensure that each agent other than n receives
his promised level of utility in the contract. The conditions in (5) are the participation12 ZAKI WAHHAJ
constraints implied by Proposition (3.2) for self-enforcing agreements. The constraints
in (6) says that agents cannot, at any time, hold negative assets, while (7) equates total
transfers made and received within the community after each history. For each set of
values U
1,..,U
n−1, the solution to this problem corresponds to a constrained eﬃcient
allocation. As noted in the previous literature, the fact that the maximisation problem
includes a constraint for each possible history in each time period, and that the number
of possible histories rise exponentially with each period makes it inconvenient to analyse
constrained eﬃcient allocations using such a programme.
Fortunately, there exists an alternative formulation of the maximisation problem, intro-
duced by Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996) that makes use of the fact
that all continuation agreements of a constrained eﬃcient agreement must also be con-
strained eﬃcient6. Furthermore, given that all the constraints are forward-looking, and
the game involves an inﬁnite horizon, the problem of determining a constrained eﬃcient
continuation agreement is the same as the original problem whenever the asset levels and
the promised utilities are the same. Therefore, the programme in (3) can also be written




































































































s = 0 (13)
for each s ∈ S
where ci
s = σki + yi
s − ˜ τi
s − ki
s. Here, the conditions in (9) correspond to the promise
keeping constraints in (4). The conditions in (10) and (11) ensure that the allocation of
6The reasoning is provided by Ligon, Thomas & Worrall (2002). Consider a subgame perfect agreement
starting at t = 0 that involves a continuation agreement, following some history ht, that is not constrained
eﬃcient. Then there exists at least one other continuation agreement which is subgame perfect and
Pareto superior. Replacing the original continuation agreement by the new agreement weakly relaxes the
participation constraints and weakly raises expected utilities in the agreement starting at t = 0. Then
the original agreement could not have been constrained eﬃcient.SOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 13
utilities in the ﬁrst period of the agreement and the promised utilities hereafter satisfy the
participation constraints for the ﬁrst period. Following the reasoning provided by Ligon,
Thomas and Worrall (2002) in a similar setting, we can show that P (.) is decreasing and
concave in each U
i.7
The basic characteristics of the constrained eﬃcient agreement can be inferred from the
ﬁrst-order conditions and the Envelope equations of the problem. From the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to transfers, we obtain the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption


















￿ for i,j = 1..n,s ∈ S
where λ





0, and therefore the ratio of marginal utilities is the same across all states where this
condition holds. Whenever the constraint binds for one agent and not the other, the ratio
shifts in favour of the ﬁrst.





i, i = 1..n
This is the marginal rate of substitution between agents i and n. Since the function P (.)
is concave in each U
i, we have λ
i increasing in U
i. Therefore, given the promised utilities
for all agents except i and n, and the initial level of assets of each, λ
i uniquely identiﬁes
the promised utility to agent i, and a higher λ
i corresponds to a higher level of utility.











7Consider two constrained eﬃcient contracts A1 and A2 that award some agent i expected utilities
equal to V i
1 and V i











, k = 1..n, the consumption streams corresponding to the two




1 (ht) + (1 − α)ck
2 (ht)
￿
, k = 1..n, where α ∈ (0,1). Since the per-period utility functions
are concave, such a consumption stream would provide agent i at least the level of utility αV i
1 +(1 − α)V i
2,















Therefore, P (.) is concave in each V i.14 ZAKI WAHHAJ






s is deﬁned as the Lagrange multiplier
on person i’s promise-keeping constraint one period into the future when the realised state
is s. Substituting for ∂P
∂Ui











This last equation shows how person i’s Pareto weight and therefore his promised utility
evolves over time. Whenever his participation constraint binds, this tends to raise his
promised utility since Ui
s is increasing in λ
i
s, and the opposite is true when the constraint
is binding for some other agent. However, note that whether his utility actually rises or
not also depends on the total assets available to the group in the new period.
From the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ki
s, the Envelope condition with respect to
ki and Lemma 3.1, we obtain the following equation (the precise steps are shown in the







































sr is the Lagrange multiplier on person i’s participation constraint following the
history of shocks (s,r). Ignoring the second and third terms on the right-hand side, this
equation is equivalent to the standard Euler condition which equates marginal utility in
the current period to expected marginal utility in the following period after adjusting for
the discount factor and the rate of return on capital. The third term on the right-hand
side appears because of the non-negativity constraint on savings. As for the second-term,
remember that Ii (z,A1|ht) is the payment that leaves an agent with wealth z indiﬀerent
between the continuation agreement A1 and autarky. Therefore the sign of the term
∂Ii
∂z depends on how an agent’s valuation of the continuation agreement changes with
wealth. Given that the term ∂V i
∂τi
t is always negative, if richer agents attach less value to
an insurance agreement, then the second term on the right-hand side of (18) will also be
negative. Then the level of savings prescribed by the constrained eﬃcient agreement will
be lower than that which is obtained from the standard Euler equation. We thus obtain
the following result:
Proposition 3.2. In the constrained eﬃcient agreement, if an agent’s valuation of an
insurance agreement is decreasing in wealth, and his participation constraint is bindingSOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 15
after some history, then his level of prescribed savings in the preceding period is below that
which is individually optimal.
Under what conditions is an agent’s valuation of an insurance agreement decreasing in
wealth? In the absence of a mutual insurance agreement, an agent can protect his own
consumption against adverse income shocks by spending a part of his savings. However,
a poorer agent is less disposed to do this for he runs a greater risk of running his stock
completely dry through a succession of misfortunes, leaving him with no means to cope
with future shocks. Therefore, in autarky, the rich would smooth consumption to a greater
extent than the poor. Consequently, even if aversion to risk is constant in the level of
wealth, an agent with a higher level of wealth places lower value on a mutual insurance
agreement. This result would be further reinforced if the Bernoulli utility function exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Proposition 3.2 highlights the inherent tension between mutual insurance under lack of
commitment and the ability to self-insure. Such an insurance network is most valuable
for poor households that have few assets to smooth consumption on their own in the
face of adverse shocks. The constrained eﬃcient agreement would provide the household
insurance against such shocks but also ensures that the household remains poor and thus
dependent on the agreement so that it is, in turn, willing to provide assistance to others
in the group as needed. This is done by requiring the household to save below the level
that is individually optimal given its future stream of income and transfers. Thus, the
agreement serves two functions: to enable poor households to smooth consumption and to
ensure that they remain poor and therefore dependent on the agreement for consumption
smoothing.
It is clear from the previous discussion that the level of assets of each individual or
household is an important determinant of the extent of insurance that can be sustained in
the community. The wealthier is a household, the better it is able to self-insure using its
own assets, and therefore the less dependent it is on a social network that would provide
support during hard times. This reasoning suggests that the poor are better insurance
partners than the rich. We can verify, using the present theoretical framework, that this
reasoning is indeed true.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the question how does replacing a poor agent in an insuring
group by a richer agent aﬀect the surplus from mutual insurance to the other n − 116 ZAKI WAHHAJ
agents. Since there will, in general, be more than one agreement that is constrained
eﬃcient, each corresponding to a diﬀerent division of the surplus, we need to make an
assumption about how the surplus from insurance is divided within the group when the
rich agent replaces the poor agent in the contract. To assume that the richer agent would
receive the same level of surplus as the poor agent he replaces is not satisfactory: since
the richer agent would place a lower value on any insurance agreement, providing him
the same level of surplus would necessarily reduce the surplus available for the remaining
agents.
We consider instead, as a benchmark, the case where the share of the rich agent in the
surplus is equal to that he would have received from the agreement that is implemented
when the poor agent is part of the insuring group. If this condition does not hold, it means
that when a rich agent replaces a poor agent in an insurance agreement, the former must
transfer a part of his extra wealth unconditionally to others in the insurance network.
An agreement where the rich agent is required to do so may well be feasible, but, as a
starting point, it is useful to consider the level of surplus from an insurance agrement to
the other participants when the richer agent is not required to make such a transfer and
thus may enjoy the full beneﬁt of his extra wealth.
Using this assumption, we can show that at least one of the remaining agents participating
in the insurance agreement is made worse oﬀ when the richer agent replaces the poorer
household in the agreement, and receives a level of utility according to the rule above.
Formally, we state this result as follows:
Proposition 3.3. In a constrained eﬃcient insurance agreement, increasing the initial
level of assets of any one agent, and raising his level of expected utility suﬃciently so
that he does not prefer the old agreement to the new one, means that one or more of the
remaining agents are worse oﬀ8.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Raising an agent’s initial level of assets
and his expected utility accordingly, tightens his participation constraint and also means
that no one else can beneﬁt from his increased wealth in the group. Then, one or more
of the other agents must be worse oﬀ. If the rich agent is able to negotiate a higher level
8Equivalently, lowering the initial level of assets of any one agent, and lowering his level of expected
utility from the agreement till the point where he is indiﬀerent between the old and the new agreements,
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of surplus for himself than that assumed above, this will reinforce the result obtained in
Proposition 3.3.
Note that the richer agent is himself receiving a smaller surplus under the assumptions
made in Proposition 3.3. The reason is that although the new agreement provides him the
same level of utility as he would have received from the agreement oﬀered to the poorer
individual, such an agreement is itself less valuable to him since he is richer and better
able to smooth consumption in autarky. It follows that when we raise the starting level of
wealth of any one agent in the community, there is no new agreement which provides every
agent at least the level of surplus they received in the original agreement. This result also
holds true when the ﬁrst-best agreement can be implemented but it is reinforced if there
are binding participation constraints after some history. Formally, we state the result in
terms of a corollary to Proposition 3.3.
Corollary 3.4. : Given a constrained eﬃcient insurance agreement, increasing the initial
level of assets of any one agent means that one or more agents must receive a lower surplus
in the revised agreement.
This result has important consequences for the formation of informal insurance groups.
It means that any group of individuals (or households) would beneﬁt more from including
a poor individual in their insurance network than a rich individual, irrespective of their
own wealth levels. If there are costs involved in developing an insurance network — say
in gaining the trust of one’s neighbours and developing the rules and norms that would
determine the obligations of the participants under diﬀerent contingencies — then an in-
dividual in a poor community is more likely to ﬁnd such an eﬀort worthwhile, than an
individual with the same level of wealth in a rich community. Reasoning thus, one may
conclude that, ceteris paribus, insurance networks are more likely to develop in poorer
communities. This idea is formalised in the next section.
4. Divergence of Communities with Differing Social Norms
In the preceding section, we learn, ﬁrst, that in a constrained eﬃcient mutual insurance
agreement, an individual saves below the level that is individually optimal; and second,
that the poor are better insurance partners than the rich. These two results together
suggest that within a population where the means of consumption smoothing are limited
to informal insurance groups and the use of own assets, the rate of consumption growth18 ZAKI WAHHAJ
should be higher for the rich versus the poor. With a very few extensions to the model,
we can demonstrate this result formally.
Consider two communities, A and B, each consisting of n agents, situated suﬃciently far
apart that there is no scope of mutual insurance across the communities. At t = 0, the
agents within each community decide whether or not to form an insurance group. Suppose
that joining an insurance group involves a cost δ to an agent in both communities. From
the Corollary to Proposition 3.3, it follows that if the initial level of assets in a community
are suﬃciently high, then there is no feasible agreement which yields a surplus δ to
each participating agent. Suppose that this is the case for community B, while agents
in community A are poor enough that at least one such agreement is possible. Then,
assuming that eﬃcient bargaining can take place, an insurance network would develop in
community A but not in B.
In community B, agents would then make consumption and savings decisions in autarky.
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￿
Rearranging this equation, we obtain the expected rate of growth of consumption as
measured by the ratio of marginal utilities between two successive time periods:
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In community A, if agents opt for an insurance agreement that is constrained eﬃcient,
then, as we have already seen, the consumption path would satisfy a modiﬁed Euler


































Assume, as for community B, that the non-negativity constraint on saving is not binding.
We obtain
E





We have thus established the following result.
Proposition 4.1. If participation in an insurance agreement carries a positive cost for an
agent, then no mutual insurance agreement will develop in a community for suﬃciently
high levels of initial wealth. Whenever the non-negativity constraints on saving do not
bind, the growth rate of consumption in this community, as measured by the expectedSOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 19
period t ratio of marginal utilities of consumption between periods t and t + 1, will be
weakly greater than in a community where a constrained-eﬃcient insurance agreement is
adopted.
Proposition 4.1 states, ﬁrst, that if there are costs involved in setting up a mutual insur-
ance agreement, then they will not appear in rich communities. The level of savings will
be individually optimal, and the expected growth in consumption will be that implied
by the standard Euler equation. By contrast, households in communities that are suﬃ-
ciently poor will ﬁnd it in their interest to put in the time and eﬀort required to create a
mutual insurance agreement. If they opt for the agreement that is constrained eﬃcient,
then households in these communities will weakly save below the level that is individually
optimal, and correspondingly, they will experience a lower consumption growth path9.
The theoretical implication of this result is that the eﬃcient ‘social norm’ that arises out
of a need for mutual insurance reinforces the gap between communities where such a need
initially exists and where it doesn’t.
Applying this result to the real world should, however, be done with caution. It involves
the implicit assumption that social norms that discourage saving arise speciﬁcally when
and where it can lead to improved insurance within a group, a claim which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider such a possibility for it
carries an important implication for empirical analysis.
In a long-term comparison between two social groups, one where the social constraints are
adopted and another where they are not, the negative eﬀects of the constraints should be
more readily observable than the positive ones. The constraints on individual behaviour
imposed by the social norm would be reﬂected in the widening gap in consumption and
wealth between the two communities. The fact that the norm also enables the poorer
community to achieve greater consumption smoothing through insurance would be less
apparent, for it is precisely because individuals in the richer community were able to
achieve at least the same level of consumption smoothing in autarky that the same norms
did not develop there. It would appear that the social norm acts, primarily, to impede
economic development when, in fact, it also plays a positive role for the community.
9Note, however, that this comparison of consumption growth paths across communities is valid only
if the non-negativity constraints on saving are not binding. If the individually optimal level of saving
equals zero, then there are no additional disincentives to save in the constrained eﬃcient agreement.20 ZAKI WAHHAJ
5. Conclusion
A common assumption in the theoretical literature on informal insurance under lack of
commitment is the absence of an intertemporal technology. This assumption may not
be innocuous since, as pointed out by Besley (1995), an intertemporal technology en-
ables an individual to engage in consumption smoothing outside of a group insurance
contract. This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap in the literature by investigating the inter-
actions between savings behaviour and self-enforcing mutual insurance agreements when
an intertemporal technology is available to agents.
The theoretical analysis shows that in the constrained eﬃcient agreement, the accumula-
tion of wealth by individuals will be constrained so that they remain dependent on the
insurance network for consumption smoothing, and therefore more willing to satisfy any
future demands for assistance from within the group. This feature of the constrained eﬃ-
cient agreement have strong parallels with anthropological observations relating to social
norms in traditional societies where a variety of cultural values and social beliefs serve to
deter the accumulation of ‘excessive’ wealth by individuals.
This theoretical result should not be interpreted as providing a causal motive for a certain
type of social norm in traditional societies. As noted by Banerjee (2002) and Greif (2006),
a game-theoretic framework provides limited scope for positive analysis of social norms
or institutions, given the usual presence of multiple equilibria. The exercise in this paper
reveals not so much when social norms that deter savings by individuals will arise, but
more signiﬁcantly, that when they do, they will have a positive eﬀect on the scope for
group cooperation, an eﬀect that will be missed in an economic analysis restricted to
individual behaviour.
As mentioned in the introduction, the relation between self-enforcing mutual insurance
agreements and savings behaviour investigated in this paper points to a more general
argument which we reiterate here: where a cooperative agreement has to be self-enforcing,
eﬃcient norms take the form that ensures continued dependence of the individual on the
service provided by the group; for it is precisely the need for this service which would
induce the individual to keep his end of the bargain.
This last statement suggests that the eﬃcient social norm would tend to accentuate —
or at least lead to persistence in — diﬀerences between social groups where the needSOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 21
for the service provided through group cooperation initially existed and where it did
not. Proposition 4.1 makes this statement formally in the context of mutual insurance
agreements. Herein lies the paradox of ’eﬃcient’ social norms: it enables the social
group to come together to take care of an existing need among its members, and yet also
encourages behaviour by individuals that would lead to the persistence of this need in the
future.
6. Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 3.1: First note that, following any history (ht−1,s), an individual
who pledges zero transfers and the autarkic savings level in each period thereafter can
guarantee himself the autarkic utility level Ui
a(σki
t−1(ht−1)+yi
s) in the continuation game.
Therefore, if an allocation A is obtained in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the conditions
in (2) must be satisﬁed. If it is not satisﬁed in some period t, after history ht for person
i, then person i would obtain a higher utility by deviating to the autarkic strategy for the
continuation game, which contradicts the deﬁnition of subgame perfection. Conversely, if
an agreement A satisﬁes the conditions in (2), then we can construct a strategy proﬁle
as follows. Each individual, after each possible history, pledges transfers and savings as
speciﬁed in the agreement and approve of all pledges that correspond to this agreement, if
all previous actions in the game follow this rule (the cooperation phase); after any devia-
tion, each individual adopt autarkic strategies for the continuation game (the punishment
phase). Then, the conditions in (2) ensure that, in the cooperation phase, a deviation
in step (ii) of the stage game, when pledges are made, or in step (iii) of the game, when
pledges are approved or rejected, cannot improve welfare. Likewise, in the punishment
phase, a deviation cannot improve welfare because the autarkic strategies are subgame
perfect. Therefore, the outlined strategy proﬁle is also subgame perfect. ￿
Proof. of Proposition 3.2: From the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ki
s, we obtain
































































sr is the Lagrange multiplier on person i’s participation constraint following the
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Let A be the constrained eﬃcient agreement that corresponds to the solution to (8) and
denote by Ui
sr the promised utility to person i from the agreement following the history



















∂z be the partial derivative of V i(.) with respect to its ﬁrst argument. Recall that
the expression ∂V i
∂z (σki
s + yi
r,A|(s,r)) represents the increase in utility to person i from a
marginal increase in initial assets, assuming that he participates in the same continuation
agreement A|(s,r). An increase in initial assets must translate into an equivalent increase
in consumption in the initial period, for savings and consumption levels in all subsequent
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where z = σki
s + yi
r. Therefore, assuming that the non-negatively constraint on saving is


































t(A|(s,r)) is always negative. Therefore, if the value of the continuation
agreement is decreasing in available assets z, then the expression involving the summation
sign on the right-hand side is also negative. Therefore, equation (22) prescribes a level of
saving below that which solves the standard Euler equation. ￿
Proof. of Proposition 3.3: Consider the constrained eﬃcient agreement that provides
agents 1..(n − 1) utility levels U
1,..,U
n−1 given initial wealth levels k1,..,kn. The utilitySOCIAL NORMS AND INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL INSURANCE 23






. We consider the eﬀect on
the constrained eﬃcient agreement of a small increase δ in the initial wealth level of some
agent i  = n when agent i is awarded the same utility in the new agreement as he would
have obtained from the old agreement at his now higher wealth level. Denote by ˜ Ui (δ)













where A is the original agreement. Then the increase in utility to agent i from the



























∂z is the partial derivative of V i(.) with respect to its ﬁrst argument. The eﬀect
of a marginal increase in the initial wealth of agent i on the utility of agent n from the
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If the valuation of the insurance agreement is decreasing in wealth, then this expression
is negative. Therefore, increasing the initial wealth of agent i, providing him the com-
pensation described above, and holding ﬁxed utility of all agents other than i and n leads
to a decrease in the level of utility for agent n in the agreement. Therefore, at least one
agent must be worse oﬀ in the agreement following an increase in the initial wealth of
some agent and an increase in utility that leaves him indiﬀerent between the old and new
agreements. ￿
Proof. of Corollary to Proposition 3.3: In Proposition 3.3, we show that if there is a small
increase in the initial wealth of agent i, then a new agreement that provides him the same
utility that he would receive from the old agreement at his new wealth level would make
at least one of the remaining agents worse oﬀ. It follows that at least one of the remaining
agents would receive a smaller surplus than in the original agreement. The eﬀect on the





































Applying Lemma 3.1 to substitute for the term within the curly brackets, we obtain
an expression that is negative. Therefore, agent i receives a smaller surplus in the new
agreement. Since the new agreement is constrained eﬃcent, this implies that, following
the increase in wealth of agent i, there is no feasible agreement in which each agent receives
the same surplus as they had received in the original agreement. ￿
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